Private Internet Access VPN for Linux – Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
London Trust Media, Inc
Private Internet Access VPN Client for Linux
v1.5 thru 2.3.1 – Fixed in v2.4.0+
A vulnerability in the Private Internet Access (PIA) VPN Client for Linux v1.5 through v2.3+ allows remote attackers to bypass an intended VPN kill switch mechanism and read sensitive information via intercepting network traffic. Since v1.5, PIA has supported a “split tunnel” OpenVPN bypass option. The PIA killswitch & associated iptables firewall is designed to protect you while using the Internet. When the kill switch is configured to block all inbound and outbound network traffic, privileged applications can continue sending & receiving network traffic if net.ipv4.ip_forward has been enabled in the system kernel parameters. For example, a Docker container running on a host with the VPN turned off, and the kill switch turned on, can continue using the internet, leaking the host IP (CWE 200). In PIA 2.4.0+, policy-based routing is enabled by default and is used to direct all forwarded packets to the VPN interface automatically.
Vendor successfully patched CVE-2020-15590 in version 2.4.0.
2020-07-07 – Vendor notified via Twitter DM.
2020-07-07 – Vendor requests submission of disclosure to London Trust Media, Inc.
2020-07-07 – Vendor disclosure via email.
2020-07-08 – CVE Requested.
2020-07-08 – Vendor replied that they do not consider this to be a vulnerability as Docker requires privileged access.
2020-07-08 – Vulnerability assigned CVE-2020-15590.
2020-07-08 – Researcher sent evidence of 2020 distributions including Docker in their base OS.
2020-07-09 – Vendor responded, discussing each of the Researcher’s points.
2020-07-20 – Researcher responded, agreed on mistakes in previous email. Researcher expanded on particulars, namely the definition of a “kill-switch”, and reiterated the expected integrity of software.
2020-07-21 – Researcher engaged a coordinating organization from CERT/CC list of coordinating organizations.
2020-07-28 – Vendor confirms they are working on documentation to mitigate issues for users who use Docker. Vendor advises they are working on a fix.
2020-08-21 – Vendor releases new version without notifying affected users.
2020-08-23 – Researcher urgently re-raises the issue after finding 100,000,000 docker pulls of a relevant project.
2020-08-24 – Vendor responds stating new version is already underway is in the next release.
2020-08-25 – Researcher agrees to alpha test new client.
2020-08-30 – Vendor sends alpha test client.
2020-08-31 – Researcher confirms vulnerability mitigated in PIA Linux Client 2.4.0.
2020-09-09 – Vendor releases PIA Client for Linux 2.4.0.
Verify if your configuration is affected
Applications that enable IP forwarding for bridged networking.
– libvirtd/QEMU, when using bridged networking
# check if you have enabled ip forwarding sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding
# AFFECTED, update to 2.4.0 # net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1 # net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 0 # AFFECTED, update to 2.4.0 # net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1 # net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 1 # AFFECTED, update to 2.4.0 # net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0 # net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 1 # UNAFFECTED, update to 2.4.0 # net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0 # net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 0 # UNAFFECTED (if no output), update to 2.4.0 anyway
PIA client for Linux users should immediately update to version 2.4.0
Manual Fix for those who don’t update
ONLY RUN THE FOLLOWING COMMANDS IF YOU DO NOT UPDATE PIA
# These rules must be reapplied each time the system is started. # Mark all forwarded packets with a fwmark iptables -w -A PREROUTING -j MARK --set-mark 0x6789 -t mangle ip6tables -w -A PREROUTING -j MARK --set-mark 0x6789 -t mangle # Create a routing table to direct forwarded packets to a specific interface, or blackhole if that interface disappears # NOTE: # - Interface route must be recreated if the interface is destroyed (i.e. a VPN tun device that is disconnected) # - The interface name may differ from tun0 # - If directing to the physical interface instead of the VPN, also specify your gateway ip route add table 26505 default dev tun0 ip route add table 26505 blackhole default metric 32000 # Leak protection route in case the route above is deleted ip -6 route add table 26505 default dev tun0 ip -6 route add table 26505 blackhole default metric 32000 # Leak protection route in case the route above is deleted # Create routing rules to direct forwarded packets to that routing table, while still permitting LAN routes from the main table ip rule add from all fwmark 0x6789 lookup main suppress_prefixlen 1 prio 2000 ip rule add from all fwmark 0x6789 lookup 26505 prio 2001 ip -6 rule add from all fwmark 0x6789 lookup main suppress_prefixlen 1 prio 2000 ip -6 rule add from all fwmark 0x6789 lookup 26505 prio 2001